fix(security): sanitize workdir parameter in terminal tool backends

Shell injection via unquoted workdir interpolation in docker, singularity,
and SSH backends.  When workdir contained shell metacharacters (e.g.
~/;id), arbitrary commands could execute.

Changes:
- Add shlex.quote() at each interpolation point in docker.py,
  singularity.py, and ssh.py with tilde-aware quoting (keep ~
  unquoted for shell expansion, quote only the subpath)
- Add _validate_workdir() allowlist in terminal_tool.py as
  defense-in-depth before workdir reaches any backend

Original work by Mariano A. Nicolini (PR #5620).  Salvaged with fixes
for tilde expansion (shlex.quote breaks cd ~/path) and replaced
incomplete deny-list with strict character allowlist.

Co-authored-by: Mariano A. Nicolini <entropidelic@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mariano A. Nicolini
2026-04-06 13:16:25 -07:00
committed by Teknium
parent 537a2b8bb8
commit af9a9f773c
4 changed files with 65 additions and 7 deletions

View File

@@ -154,6 +154,34 @@ def _check_all_guards(command: str, env_type: str) -> dict:
approval_callback=_approval_callback)
# Allowlist: characters that can legitimately appear in directory paths.
# Covers alphanumeric, path separators, tilde, dot, hyphen, underscore, space,
# plus, at, equals, and comma. Everything else is rejected.
_WORKDIR_SAFE_RE = re.compile(r'^[A-Za-z0-9/_\-.~ +@=,]+$')
def _validate_workdir(workdir: str) -> str | None:
"""Reject workdir values that don't look like a filesystem path.
Uses an allowlist of safe characters rather than a deny-list, so novel
shell metacharacters can't slip through.
Returns None if safe, or an error message string if dangerous.
"""
if not workdir:
return None
if not _WORKDIR_SAFE_RE.match(workdir):
# Find the first offending character for a helpful message.
for ch in workdir:
if not _WORKDIR_SAFE_RE.match(ch):
return (
f"Blocked: workdir contains disallowed character {repr(ch)}. "
"Use a simple filesystem path without shell metacharacters."
)
return "Blocked: workdir contains disallowed characters."
return None
def _handle_sudo_failure(output: str, env_type: str) -> str:
"""
Check for sudo failure and add helpful message for messaging contexts.
@@ -1166,6 +1194,19 @@ def terminal_tool(
desc = approval.get("description", "flagged as dangerous")
approval_note = f"Command was flagged ({desc}) and auto-approved by smart approval."
# Validate workdir against shell injection
if workdir:
workdir_error = _validate_workdir(workdir)
if workdir_error:
logger.warning("Blocked dangerous workdir: %s (command: %s)",
workdir[:200], command[:200])
return json.dumps({
"output": "",
"exit_code": -1,
"error": workdir_error,
"status": "blocked"
}, ensure_ascii=False)
# Prepare command for execution
if background:
# Spawn a tracked background process via the process registry.