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8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Teknium
e1fc0ad536 fix: remove stale test (missing pop_pending), add headers to FakeResponse
Follow-up fixes for cherry-pick conflicts:
- Removed test_context_keeps_pending_approval test that referenced
  pop_pending() which doesn't exist on current main
- Added headers attribute to FakeResponse in vision test (needed
  after #6949 added Content-Length check)
2026-04-11 01:51:11 -07:00
Kenny Xie
177e42e90a test(approval): clear leaked bypass state 2026-04-11 01:49:29 -07:00
Kenny Xie
224fc4c29f test(gateway): isolate blocking approval env 2026-04-11 01:49:12 -07:00
Kenny Xie
f9a94c65e6 test(tools): isolate approval and audio gateway env 2026-04-11 01:49:12 -07:00
Tranquil-Flow
e36917867a fix(vision): reject oversized images before API call, handle file:// URIs, improve 400 errors
Three fixes for vision_analyze returning cryptic 400 "Invalid request data":

1. Pre-flight base64 size check — base64 inflates data ~33%, so a 3.8 MB
   file exceeds the 5 MB API limit. Reject early with a clear message
   instead of letting the provider return a generic 400.

2. Handle file:// URIs — strip the scheme and resolve as a local path.
   Previously file:///path/to/image.png fell through to the "invalid
   image source" error since it matched neither is_file() nor http(s).

3. Separate invalid_request errors from "does not support vision" errors
   so the user gets actionable guidance (resize/compress/retry) instead
   of a misleading "model does not support vision" message.

Closes #6677
2026-04-11 01:48:19 -07:00
aaronagent
4aa97af895 fix: cap image download size at 50 MB, validate tool call parser fields
vision_tools.py: _download_image() loads the full HTTP response body into
memory via response.content (line 190) with no Content-Length check and no
max file size limit.  An attacker-hosted multi-gigabyte file causes OOM.
Add a 50 MB hard cap: check Content-Length header before download, and
verify actual body size before writing to disk.

hermes_parser.py: tc_data["name"] at line 57 raises KeyError when the LLM
outputs a tool call JSON without a "name" field.  The outer except catches
it silently, causing the entire tool call to be lost with zero diagnostics.
Add "name" field validation before constructing the ChatCompletionMessage.

mistral_parser.py: tc["name"] at line 101 has the same KeyError issue in
the pre-v11 format path.  The fallback decoder (line 112) already checks
"name" correctly, but the primary path does not.  Add validation to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-11 01:48:13 -07:00
aaronagent
ae9c1f22c1 fix: prevent zombie processes, redact cron stderr, skip symlinks in skill enumeration
process_registry.py: _reader_loop() has process.wait() after the try-except
block (line 380).  If the reader thread crashes with an unexpected exception
(e.g. MemoryError, KeyboardInterrupt), control exits the except handler but
skips wait() — leaving the child as a zombie process.  Move wait() and the
cleanup into a finally block so the child is always reaped.

cron/scheduler.py: _run_job_script() only redacts secrets in stdout on the
SUCCESS path (line 417-421).  When a cron script fails (non-zero exit), both
stdout and stderr are returned WITHOUT redaction (lines 407-413).  A script
that accidentally prints an API key to stderr during a failure would leak it
into the LLM context.  Move redaction before the success/failure branch so
both paths benefit.

skill_commands.py: _build_skill_message() enumerates supporting files using
rglob("*") but only checks is_file() (line 171) without filtering symlinks.
PR #6693 added symlink protection to scan_skill_commands() but missed this
function.  A malicious skill can create symlinks in references/ pointing to
arbitrary files, exposing their paths (and potentially content via skill_view)
to the LLM.  Add is_symlink() check to match the guard in scan_skill_commands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-11 01:48:13 -07:00
kagura-agent
2a9e115210 fix: normalize numeric MCP server names to str (fixes #6901)
YAML parses bare numeric keys (e.g. `12306:`) as int, causing
TypeError when sorted() is called on mixed int/str collections.

Changes:
- Normalize toolset_names entries to str in _get_platform_tools()
- Cast MCP server name to str(name) when building enabled_mcp_servers
- Add regression test
2026-04-11 01:48:13 -07:00
12 changed files with 247 additions and 24 deletions

View File

@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ def _build_skill_message(
subdir_path = skill_dir / subdir
if subdir_path.exists():
for f in sorted(subdir_path.rglob("*")):
if f.is_file():
if f.is_file() and not f.is_symlink():
rel = str(f.relative_to(skill_dir))
supporting.append(rel)

View File

@@ -442,6 +442,14 @@ def _run_job_script(script_path: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
stdout = (result.stdout or "").strip()
stderr = (result.stderr or "").strip()
# Redact secrets from both stdout and stderr before any return path.
try:
from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
stdout = redact_sensitive_text(stdout)
stderr = redact_sensitive_text(stderr)
except Exception:
pass
if result.returncode != 0:
parts = [f"Script exited with code {result.returncode}"]
if stderr:
@@ -450,13 +458,6 @@ def _run_job_script(script_path: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
parts.append(f"stdout:\n{stdout}")
return False, "\n".join(parts)
# Redact any secrets that may appear in script output before
# they are injected into the LLM prompt context.
try:
from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
stdout = redact_sensitive_text(stdout)
except Exception:
pass
return True, stdout
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:

View File

@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ class HermesToolCallParser(ToolCallParser):
continue
tc_data = json.loads(raw_json)
if "name" not in tc_data:
continue
tool_calls.append(
ChatCompletionMessageToolCall(
id=f"call_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}",

View File

@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ class MistralToolCallParser(ToolCallParser):
parsed = [parsed]
for tc in parsed:
if "name" not in tc:
continue
args = tc.get("arguments", {})
if isinstance(args, dict):
args = json.dumps(args, ensure_ascii=False)

View File

@@ -501,6 +501,10 @@ def _get_platform_tools(
default_ts = PLATFORMS[platform]["default_toolset"]
toolset_names = [default_ts]
# YAML may parse bare numeric names (e.g. ``12306:``) as int.
# Normalise to str so downstream sorted() never mixes types.
toolset_names = [str(ts) for ts in toolset_names]
configurable_keys = {ts_key for ts_key, _, _ in CONFIGURABLE_TOOLSETS}
# If the saved list contains any configurable keys directly, the user
@@ -559,7 +563,7 @@ def _get_platform_tools(
# Special sentinel: "no_mcp" in the toolset list disables all MCP servers.
mcp_servers = config.get("mcp_servers") or {}
enabled_mcp_servers = {
name
str(name)
for name, server_cfg in mcp_servers.items()
if isinstance(server_cfg, dict)
and _parse_enabled_flag(server_cfg.get("enabled", True), default=True)

View File

@@ -345,6 +345,11 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
def setup_method(self):
_clear_approval_state()
os.environ.pop("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", None)
def test_blocking_approval_approve_once(self):
"""check_all_command_guards blocks until resolve_gateway_approval is called."""
@@ -364,6 +369,7 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
from tools.approval import reset_current_session_key, set_current_session_key
token = set_current_session_key(session_key)
os.environ["HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_EXEC_ASK"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_KEY"] = session_key
try:
@@ -371,6 +377,7 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
"rm -rf /important", "local"
)
finally:
os.environ.pop("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", None)
reset_current_session_key(token)
@@ -410,6 +417,7 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
from tools.approval import reset_current_session_key, set_current_session_key
token = set_current_session_key(session_key)
os.environ["HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_EXEC_ASK"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_KEY"] = session_key
try:
@@ -417,6 +425,7 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
"rm -rf /important", "local"
)
finally:
os.environ.pop("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", None)
reset_current_session_key(token)
@@ -451,6 +460,7 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
from tools.approval import reset_current_session_key, set_current_session_key
token = set_current_session_key(session_key)
os.environ["HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_EXEC_ASK"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_KEY"] = session_key
try:
@@ -460,6 +470,7 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
"rm -rf /important", "local"
)
finally:
os.environ.pop("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", None)
reset_current_session_key(token)
@@ -491,11 +502,13 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
from tools.approval import reset_current_session_key, set_current_session_key
token = set_current_session_key(session_key)
os.environ["HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_EXEC_ASK"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_KEY"] = session_key
try:
results[idx] = check_all_command_guards(cmd, "local")
finally:
os.environ.pop("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", None)
reset_current_session_key(token)
@@ -546,11 +559,13 @@ class TestBlockingApprovalE2E:
from tools.approval import reset_current_session_key, set_current_session_key
token = set_current_session_key(session_key)
os.environ["HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_EXEC_ASK"] = "1"
os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_KEY"] = session_key
try:
results[idx] = check_all_command_guards(cmd, "local")
finally:
os.environ.pop("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", None)
os.environ.pop("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", None)
reset_current_session_key(token)

View File

@@ -428,3 +428,31 @@ class TestPlatformToolsetConsistency:
f"Platform {platform!r} in tools_config but missing from "
f"skills_config PLATFORMS"
)
def test_numeric_mcp_server_name_does_not_crash_sorted():
"""YAML parses bare numeric keys (e.g. ``12306:``) as int.
_get_platform_tools must normalise them to str so that sorted()
on the returned set never raises TypeError on mixed int/str.
Regression test for https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/6901
"""
config = {
"platform_toolsets": {"cli": ["web", 12306]},
"mcp_servers": {
12306: {"url": "https://example.com/mcp"},
"normal-server": {"url": "https://example.com/mcp2"},
},
}
enabled = _get_platform_tools(config, "cli")
# All names must be str — no int leaking through
assert all(isinstance(name, str) for name in enabled), (
f"Non-string toolset names found: {enabled}"
)
assert "12306" in enabled
# sorted() must not raise TypeError
sorted(enabled)

View File

@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ class TestSessionKeyContext:
assert "reset_current_session_key" in called_names
class TestRmFalsePositiveFix:
"""Regression tests: filenames starting with 'r' must NOT trigger recursive delete."""

View File

@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ def test_openai_tts_uses_managed_audio_gateway_when_direct_key_absent(monkeypatc
_install_fake_tools_package()
_install_fake_openai_module(captured)
monkeypatch.delenv("VOICE_TOOLS_OPENAI_KEY", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", raising=False)
monkeypatch.setenv("TOOL_GATEWAY_DOMAIN", "nousresearch.com")
monkeypatch.setenv("TOOL_GATEWAY_USER_TOKEN", "nous-token")
@@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ def test_transcription_uses_model_specific_response_formats(monkeypatch, tmp_pat
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path))
(tmp_path / "config.yaml").write_text("stt:\n provider: openai\n")
monkeypatch.delenv("VOICE_TOOLS_OPENAI_KEY", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", raising=False)
monkeypatch.setenv("TOOL_GATEWAY_DOMAIN", "nousresearch.com")
monkeypatch.setenv("TOOL_GATEWAY_USER_TOKEN", "nous-token")

View File

@@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ class TestVisionSafetyGuards:
class FakeResponse:
url = "https://blocked.test/final.png"
headers = {"content-length": "24"}
content = b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * 16
def raise_for_status(self):
@@ -533,6 +534,133 @@ class TestTildeExpansion:
assert data["success"] is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# file:// URI support
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestFileUriSupport:
"""Verify that file:// URIs resolve as local file paths."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_file_uri_resolved_as_local_path(self, tmp_path):
"""file:///absolute/path should be treated as a local file."""
img = tmp_path / "photo.png"
img.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * 8)
mock_response = MagicMock()
mock_choice = MagicMock()
mock_choice.message.content = "A test image"
mock_response.choices = [mock_choice]
with (
patch(
"tools.vision_tools._image_to_base64_data_url",
return_value="",
),
patch(
"tools.vision_tools.async_call_llm",
new_callable=AsyncMock,
return_value=mock_response,
),
):
result = await vision_analyze_tool(
f"file://{img}", "describe this", "test/model"
)
data = json.loads(result)
assert data["success"] is True
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_file_uri_nonexistent_gives_error(self, tmp_path):
"""file:// pointing to a missing file should fail gracefully."""
result = await vision_analyze_tool(
f"file://{tmp_path}/nonexistent.png", "describe this", "test/model"
)
data = json.loads(result)
assert data["success"] is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Base64 size pre-flight check
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestBase64SizeLimit:
"""Verify that oversized images are rejected before hitting the API."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_oversized_image_rejected_before_api_call(self, tmp_path):
"""Images exceeding 5 MB base64 should fail with a clear size error."""
img = tmp_path / "huge.png"
img.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * (4 * 1024 * 1024))
with patch("tools.vision_tools.async_call_llm", new_callable=AsyncMock) as mock_llm:
result = json.loads(await vision_analyze_tool(str(img), "describe this"))
assert result["success"] is False
assert "too large" in result["error"].lower()
mock_llm.assert_not_awaited()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_small_image_not_rejected(self, tmp_path):
"""Images well under the limit should pass the size check."""
img = tmp_path / "small.png"
img.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * 64)
mock_response = MagicMock()
mock_choice = MagicMock()
mock_choice.message.content = "Small image"
mock_response.choices = [mock_choice]
with (
patch(
"tools.vision_tools.async_call_llm",
new_callable=AsyncMock,
return_value=mock_response,
),
):
result = json.loads(await vision_analyze_tool(str(img), "describe this", "test/model"))
assert result["success"] is True
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Error classification for 400 responses
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestErrorClassification:
"""Verify that API 400 errors produce actionable guidance."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_invalid_request_error_gives_image_guidance(self, tmp_path):
"""An invalid_request_error from the API should mention image size/format."""
img = tmp_path / "test.png"
img.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * 8)
api_error = Exception(
"Error code: 400 - {'type': 'error', 'error': "
"{'type': 'invalid_request_error', 'message': 'Invalid request data'}}"
)
with (
patch(
"tools.vision_tools._image_to_base64_data_url",
return_value="",
),
patch(
"tools.vision_tools.async_call_llm",
new_callable=AsyncMock,
side_effect=api_error,
),
):
result = json.loads(await vision_analyze_tool(str(img), "describe", "test/model"))
assert result["success"] is False
assert "rejected the image" in result["analysis"].lower()
assert "smaller" in result["analysis"].lower()
class TestVisionRegistration:
def test_vision_analyze_registered(self):
from tools.registry import registry

View File

@@ -396,15 +396,15 @@ class ProcessRegistry:
session.output_buffer = session.output_buffer[-session.max_output_chars:]
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Process stdout reader ended: %s", e)
# Process exited
try:
session.process.wait(timeout=5)
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Process wait timed out or failed: %s", e)
session.exited = True
session.exit_code = session.process.returncode
self._move_to_finished(session)
finally:
# Always reap the child to prevent zombie processes.
try:
session.process.wait(timeout=5)
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Process wait timed out or failed: %s", e)
session.exited = True
session.exit_code = session.process.returncode
self._move_to_finished(session)
def _env_poller_loop(
self, session: ProcessSession, env: Any, log_path: str, pid_path: str, exit_path: str

View File

@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ def _resolve_download_timeout() -> float:
_VISION_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT = _resolve_download_timeout()
# Hard cap on downloaded image file size (50 MB). Prevents OOM from
# attacker-hosted multi-gigabyte files or decompression bombs.
_VISION_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024
def _validate_image_url(url: str) -> bool:
"""
@@ -181,13 +185,25 @@ async def _download_image(image_url: str, destination: Path, max_retries: int =
)
response.raise_for_status()
# Reject overly large images early via Content-Length header.
cl = response.headers.get("content-length")
if cl and int(cl) > _VISION_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES:
raise ValueError(
f"Image too large ({int(cl)} bytes, max {_VISION_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES})"
)
final_url = str(response.url)
blocked = check_website_access(final_url)
if blocked:
raise PermissionError(blocked["message"])
# Save the image content
destination.write_bytes(response.content)
# Save the image content (double-check actual size)
body = response.content
if len(body) > _VISION_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES:
raise ValueError(
f"Image too large ({len(body)} bytes, max {_VISION_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES})"
)
destination.write_bytes(body)
return destination
except Exception as e:
@@ -326,7 +342,11 @@ async def vision_analyze_tool(
logger.info("User prompt: %s", user_prompt[:100])
# Determine if this is a local file path or a remote URL
local_path = Path(os.path.expanduser(image_url))
# Strip file:// scheme so file URIs resolve as local paths.
resolved_url = image_url
if resolved_url.startswith("file://"):
resolved_url = resolved_url[len("file://"):]
local_path = Path(os.path.expanduser(resolved_url))
if local_path.is_file():
# Local file path (e.g. from platform image cache) -- skip download
logger.info("Using local image file: %s", image_url)
@@ -362,7 +382,19 @@ async def vision_analyze_tool(
# Calculate size in KB for better readability
data_size_kb = len(image_data_url) / 1024
logger.info("Image converted to base64 (%.1f KB)", data_size_kb)
# Pre-flight size check: most vision APIs cap base64 payloads at 5 MB.
# Reject early with a clear message instead of a cryptic provider 400.
_MAX_BASE64_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024 # 5 MB
# The data URL includes the header (e.g. "data:image/jpeg;base64,") which
# is negligible, but measure the full string to be safe.
if len(image_data_url) > _MAX_BASE64_BYTES:
raise ValueError(
f"Image too large for vision API: base64 payload is "
f"{len(image_data_url) / (1024 * 1024):.1f} MB (limit 5 MB). "
f"Resize or compress the image and try again."
)
debug_call_data["image_size_bytes"] = image_size_bytes
# Use the prompt as provided (model_tools.py now handles full description formatting)
@@ -455,14 +487,21 @@ async def vision_analyze_tool(
f"API provider account and try again. Error: {e}"
)
elif any(hint in err_str for hint in (
"does not support", "not support image", "invalid_request",
"content_policy", "image_url", "multimodal",
"does not support", "not support image",
"content_policy", "multimodal",
"unrecognized request argument", "image input",
)):
analysis = (
f"{model} does not support vision or our request was not "
f"accepted by the server. Error: {e}"
)
elif "invalid_request" in err_str or "image_url" in err_str:
analysis = (
"The vision API rejected the image. This can happen when the "
"image is too large, in an unsupported format, or corrupted. "
"Try a smaller JPEG/PNG (under 3.5 MB) and retry. "
f"Error: {e}"
)
else:
analysis = (
"There was a problem with the request and the image could not "